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I. Introduction 
A young couple expecting their first child might consult healthgrades.com hospital 
rankings to help choose where to deliver their baby.  A year later, the couple decides they need 
an SUV and consults performance specifications provided by manufacturers and reads Consumer 
Reports to learn about reliability.  Soon thereafter, the couple obtains test score results from 
several school districts to help choose where to raise their family.  When their child is in high 
school they peruse US News and World Reports rankings of universities.  Once their child is off 
to college, they plan for retirement by investing in AAA-rated corporate bonds and browse 
through Medicare's Nursing Home Compare to help plan for their parents' final years. 
Literally from cradle to grave, consumers rely on quality disclosure to make important 
purchases.  Although disclosure has a long history that we describe below, it has attracted 
considerable attention in the past few years, especially in the areas of healthcare, education, and 
finance.  President Obama has made quality reporting a key component of his healthcare reform 
effort.  President Bush's No Children Left Behind initiative relies on testing and disclosure to 
evaluate and, potentially, punish, underperforming public schools.  Many states have similar 
programs.  And much of the finger pointing for the recent crisis on Wall Street has been directed 
at corporate bond rating agencies that seemed to ignore systematic risk while giving firms clean 
bills of health.  Many policy analysts in these and other industries believe that we need more and 
better disclosure. 
In this essay, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on disclosure.  Section I 
compares quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and offers a brief history 
of disclosure.  In section II, we address three key theoretical issues: (i) Why don't sellers 
voluntarily disclose through a process of "unraveling?" (ii) How would government-mandated 
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 disclosure differ from voluntary disclosure in costs and benefits? and (iii) Do certifiers 
necessarily report unbiased and accurate information?   Section III discusses empirical evidence 
on disclosure with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance.  We begin with a 
practical question: How is quality measured and reported?  We then present evidence that 
unraveling often does not occur in practice, thereby creating a need for third party disclosure.  
We review whether third party disclosure helps consumers make better choices and whether it 
encourages sellers to improve quality.  We also identify situations where sellers exploit private 
information so as to boost their ratings at the expense of consumers.  We conclude the review of 
empirical evidence by examining the behavior of certifiers.  Section IV concludes with 
suggestions for further research. 
 
I.1 Disclosure versus other quality assurance mechanisms 
  We define quality disclosure as an effort by a certification agency to systematically 
measure and report product quality for a nontrivial percentage of products in a market.  While we 
are mainly interested in third-party disclosure, we also include direct quality disclosure by 
sellers, provided that the disclosed information can be independently verified.  This definition 
distinguishes disclosure from broader marketing efforts by sellers that do not contain verifiable 
product information.  It also distinguishes disclosure from forums such as town squares, barber 
shops, or, more recently, Internet sites such as Angie’s List where individuals share word-of-
mouth reviews of local service providers without systematic editing and scoring.  The latter 
distinction is admittedly blurry; ratings such as Amazon.com’s customer reviews have elements 
of both a “town square” forum and a systematic report card.   
Quality disclosure can take many forms. Sellers may voluntarily report product attributes.  
For example, a hospital may disclose that the majority of its medical staff is board certified.  Or 
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 an auto manufacturer may report performance specifications.  An industry concerned about the 
lemons problem may establish a certification agency to collect and disseminate product 
information.  Examples include the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO), which reports the frequency of “sentinel events” (instances of poor 
quality) at member hospitals; and the Motion Picture Association of America, which is 
responsible for the familiar G/PG/R/M movie rating system.  In these cases, sellers have the 
choice of disclosing or not disclosing quality information via the certification agency.  Those that 
choose to disclose often pay a fee to cover the cost of certification.   
Many industries face mandatory disclosure, whereby a regulatory body requires sellers to 
disclose certain product attributes in a standard format.  In some cases, sellers must provide 
verifiable information to a designated agency (e.g. automobile manufacturers measure fuel 
economy and report the results to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).  In other cases, 
government officials inspect the product on site (e.g. a local health board inspects restaurant 
hygiene).  Mandatory disclosure often focuses on health and safety issues and ignores other 
product attributes that might influence demand.  For example, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration requires food manufacturers to report nutritional information but does not 
evaluate taste.  In recent years, U.S. government agencies have expanded disclosure to include 
many other factors that can influence demand, including mortality rates for hospitals, on-time 
arrival rates for airlines, graduation rates for high schools, and consumer satisfaction with 
Medicare Advantage health insurance plans.  There are similar disclosure requirements in many 
other nations.  The targeted audience has also shifted from government officials who might fine 
or even shut down a business that failed inspection to the consumers whose demands will 
determine the fate of low scoring firms.  By posting results online and publicizing them through 
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 the media, government certifiers hope to ensure that consumers can access the disclosed 
information with little cost and in a timely manner.  
In addition to industry-sponsored voluntary disclosure and government-enforced 
mandatory disclosure, many private third-party certifiers adopt disclosure regimes to satisfy 
market demand for quality information.
1 Examples include the Leapfrog Group’s hospital 
quality ratings, Moody's bond ratings, Consumer Reports' evaluation of consumer products, an
U.S. News & World Report’s ranking of colleges.  Some of these third-parties (e.g. Leapfrog) 
must obtain data directly from sellers and therefore require seller participation. Others may use 
public information (e.g., U.S News) to evaluate the products and do not require seller 
participation. In some cases, certifiers may be financially affiliated with sellers, introducing a 
conflict of interest. Stock analysts working for a brokerage firm that underwrites initial public 
offerings are often cited as an example
d 
 of such conflict.  
                                                
  Aside from disclosure, there are many other well-known mechanisms for informing 
consumers about product attributes.  We will call these “quality assurance” mechanisms, though 
in some cases they provide information about horizontal product attributes rather than vertical 
quality dimensions.  Table 1 gives examples of the mechanisms used to help assure quality in a 
wide array of markets.  All of these markets can be considered credence goods and many are 
experience goods, in that consumers may find it difficult to evaluate quality of all of these goods 
prior to purchase but may be able to assess quality of some of them after purchase. 
Table 1 about here 
As suggested by Table 1, brand and experience are perhaps the most common quality 
assurance mechanisms, but they are rarely sufficient.  One limitation is that even with 
experience, consumers may find it difficult to link ex-post product failure with a product defect; 
 
1 Demand for quality information is usually stronger for credence goods because consumers have difficulty 
assessing their quality via search or experience.  
5 
 think of a automobile owner establishing the reason for premature brake wear or whether a 
hospital patient determining whether the medical staff is responsible for an adverse outcome.  
Experience and word-of-mouth are also of limited value when products are infrequently 
purchased, such as open heart surgery and executive education.  Disclosure has the potential to 
overcome these limitations because certifiers may have better expertise evaluating the product 
and they can aggregate experiences from many idiosyncratic consumers. 
Branding, another common quality assurance mechanism, is usually initiated and 
maintained through the seller's marketing efforts.   It is unclear whether branding acts as a 
“bond” in which the seller sinks an investment in branding to signal its high quality or whether 
branding makes it easier for consumers to recall their positive experiences when making repeat 
purchases.
2   In any event, consumers may find third-party disclosure more trustworthy than 
brands.    
In some cases, sellers may offer warranties, especially if the value of the product is large 
relative to the cost to consumers of exercising the warranty.  Thus, we see warranties for 
automobiles and televisions, but not for diapers or light bulbs.  Warranties are also uncommon 
for professional services because consumers have difficulty gauging service quality even after 
consumption.
3  Warranties for hospital care are almost unheard of, for example. Compared with 
disclosure, warranties often focus on narrow aspects of product performance, such as complete 
failure, and may not assure gradations of quality.   
While most quality assurance mechanisms directly assure product quality, licensing 
focuses on inputs (e.g. training or staffing) rather than outputs.  Licensing is usually done by a 
government agency, but some industries do their own credentialing.  A good example is JCAHO 
hospital credentialing.  Many insurers refuse to reimburse for services performed at non-
                                                 
2 See Bagwell (2007) for a summary of advertising literature. 
3As an exception, plaintiffs’ attorneys in some litigation cases work on a strict contingency basis.   
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 credentialed hospitals.  Sometimes government agencies may also establish a minimum quality 
standard that measures quality directly but does not differentiate quality above the minimum 
standard.  Economists have long debated whether licensing or minimum quality standards serve 
to control entry, assure quality, or both.
4  In comparison, disclosure does not have a direct impact 
on entry, though the disclosed information may motivate consumers to shy away from low 
quality products and eventually drive out low-quality sellers.    
Another way to look at Table 1 is to identify the credibility and source of the quality 
assurance mechanism.  Warranties and brands are offered and established by individual firms as 
a way to assure consumers of their own quality.  Assuming they are enforceable, the 
effectiveness of warranties is self-explanatory.  Brands have credibility because they are 
developed over time on the basis of experience and often require considerable expense to 
maintain.  Industries often assure quality of member firms, through disclosure, credentialing, or 
lobbying for licensing laws.  Although these may serve as entry barriers, they may also limit the 
ability of member firms to free ride off of the industry’s overall positive reputation.
5    
Aside from disclosure by an industry group, certifying firms are usually independent of 
the individual firms they assess.  The JCAHO may certify hospitals, but individual members do 
not otherwise provide industry-wide quality reports.  An obvious explanation is the potential 
conflict of interest.  One interesting exception occurs when financial analysts evaluate stock 
offerings in their own names, even though they are employed by investment banks involved in 
the offerings.  This practice could endure if the analyst's own name is separable from the 
employer and the analyst develops a reputation of unbiasedness and accuracy. 
To summarize, disclosure has three distinguishing features: First, disclosure 
systematically measures and disseminates information about product quality, which makes it 
                                                 
4 Stigler (1971). 
5 Dranove (1988). 
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 attractive when other mechanisms for quality assurance are inadequate and the value of quality 
information when aggregated across all consumers is large relative to the costs of information 
collection.
6  Second, disclosure is usually conducted via third-party certifier(s) that identify 
themselves separately from manufacturers. This may give consumers an impression that the 
disclosed information is more trustworthy than seller advertising.
7  Third, disclosure standardizes 
quality assessment so that results are readily comparable across sellers. Instead of granting the 
power of licensing to government officials, disclosure empowers consumer with information 
with the expectation that consumer choice will provide sufficient incentives to assure quality.   
 Disclosure both complements and substitutes for other quality assurance mechanisms.  In 
lemons markets, disclosure provides more precise and comparable information than word of 
mouth, warranties and brand names.  Positive reviews may be especially helpful to companies 
that lack a strong brand.  The conventional wisdom is that strong reviews in Consumer Reports 
were critical to the successful 1970s invasion by Japanese automakers into the American car 
market.  By the same token, negative reviews can bring down established brands, as occurred 
after Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed chronicled problems with the Chevrolet Corvair.  Firms 
in lemons markets may even band together and voluntarily disclose quality as a way to prevent 
an Akerlof-style adverse selection death spiral.
8 In the case of car safety, the 2000 mandated 
                                                 
6A glimpse at Consumer Reports and similar publications suggests that these factors are present in virtually all 
consumer goods markets where the goods are traded nationally or internationally, so that a single disclosure report 
can reach millions of potential consumers.  Voluntary disclosure has traditionally been less common for local 
services where the costs of systematically collecting and disseminating information may be prohibitive relative to 
the size of the audience.  The Internet may be reducing these costs, however. 
7When producers self-disclose quantifiable quality information, consumers might infer that such information can be 
verified by third parties and is therefore trustworthy.  Whether certifier-provided information is indeed more 
trustworthy than producer disclosure or consumer experience depends on certifier incentives, an active research 
topic we will review in details in Sections 4 and 5.  
8Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997). 
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 disclosure of rollover risks




I.2  A Brief History of Disclosure 
Quality assurance has a long history.  The term branding is derived from the practice of 
marking livestock that dates back as far as 2000 BC.
11  Averill Paints secured the first U.S. 
trademark (an eagle) in 1870 while Bass and Company (the brewer) and Lyle’s Golden Syrup 
both claim to be Europe’s oldest brand, sometime in the late 19
th century.
12  Licensing in the 
United States can be traced to colonial days, when physicians had to obtain permission to 
practice from colonial governors.   
Voluntary disclosure by industry participants emerged in the United States in the 19
th 
century.  The Chicago Board of Trade established a system for grading wheat (an example of 
voluntary disclosure) in 1848.   In 1894, the National Board of Fire Underwriters established the 
Underwriters’ Electrical Bureau (the predecessor to Underwriters Laboratories), which, in 
exchange for a fee, tested and reported on the safety of fittings and electrical devices.  This gave 
high quality sellers a way to distinguish themselves from inferior competitors.   
According to Fung, Graham and Weil (2007), U.S. government-mandated disclosure 
began with the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, which provided for inspection of meat products 
and monitoring of food and drug labeling.  Since then, disclosure laws have spread to other 
markets. For example, the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act requires public companies to file 
unaudited financial statements quarterly and audited financial statements annually, the 1968 
                                                 
9Specified by the 2000 Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act. 
10Specified by the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users. 
11This information was obtained from Daye, D. and Van Auken, B., 2006, “History of Branding”.  
http://www.brandingstrategyinsider.com/2006/08/history_of_bran.html  Searched 12/15/2008. 
12Source:  Wikipedia.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trademark#Oldest_trademarks and  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brand#History    
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 Truth in Lending Act requires clear disclosure of key terms and all costs associated with a 
lending contract), and the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
produces EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory Report.   Other examples include the 1990 Nutritional 
Labeling and Education Act, and the hospital and doctor report cards adopted by New York and 
Pennsylvania in early 1990s. 
The 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act was a response to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, 
Samuel Hopkins Adams’ The Great American Fraud and other accounts of the meat packing and 
patent medicines industries.   Horrific accounts of “Thalidomide babies” led to the 1962 FDA 
Amendments.
13  Despite these high profile examples, Wilson (1982) argues that mandatory 
disclosure laws are difficult to enact because the potential benefits are diffused among millions 
of individual consumers whereas the costs are concentrated among a few highly motivated 
sellers who can better capture the regulatory system. Graham (2002) gives three detailed 
examples of how public attention, industry lobbying, and political compromise shape mandatory 
disclosure laws.  
Disclosure does not necessarily require legislation. Market driven, third-party disclosure 
first occurred in 1909 when John Moody issued bond ratings, followed quickly by Poor's 
Publishing in 1916 and Standard Statistics in 1922.
14  The first issue of Consumers’ Union 
Reports (the predecessor to Consumer Reports) appeared in May 1936 and featured evaluations 
of milk, breakfast cereals, soap, and stockings.  The Internet has profoundly affected quality 
disclosure.  Not only does the Internet facilitate the dissemination of quality information, it has 
spawned quality-rating websites such as cnet.com (consumer electronics), imdb.com (movie 
reviews), and tripadvisor.com (hotels).   Rather than rely on experienced certifier(s) attesting to 
product quality, most of these web sites aggregate the experiences of individual consumers.   
                                                 
13 Thalidomide was a sleeping pill.  Some pregnant women who used Thalidomide gave birth to infants with horrible 
deformities.   
14The two companies merged in 1941, forming S&P, which was absorbed by McGraw-Hill in 1966. 
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I.3 Central Questions 
The cursory history of disclosure raises numerous questions about the economics of 
disclosure: 
· How do consumers respond to disclosure?  Does the response depend on the source of 
the quality information (mandatory versus voluntary versus third party)? Does the 
response differ by the contents and presentation of the disclosed information? 
· How do sellers respond to disclosure?  Why do some sellers disclose but not others?  
Why do some industries disclose but not others? Do sellers improve quality after a 
disclosure system is in place? Does disclosure drive out low quality sellers? 
· Do we need mandatory disclosure, or will the market provide sufficient quality 
assurance through voluntary or third-party disclosure?   
· What is the economics of certifiers?  Do they have incentives to be truthful and 
thorough? Does it matter if they collect revenue from sellers or buyers? How would 
competition, reputation, monitoring and the disclosure of conflicted interest affect 
certifier behavior?    
  In the remainder of this essay we review the theory and evidence on disclosure and 
certification.  Most of the theoretical work focuses on the incentives for firms to voluntarily 
disclose quality and for certifiers to provide unbiased certification about product quality.   
Several empirical papers also address voluntary disclosure.  Much of the empirical literature 
identifies challenges facing the practice of disclosure, ranging from measurement problems to 
unintended consequences and certifier bias.  In the final section, we present some preliminary 
thoughts on the potential directions of future research. Our review is by no means exhaustive, 
nor do our examples cover all the industries that have adopted or attempted to adopt quality 
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 disclosure in practice.  Even so, we cite scores of studies; for easy reference Table 2 lists the 
citations by themes of insight. 
Table 2 about here 
 
II. Theory 
    The theory of quality disclosure can be divided into two strands.  The first strand 
examines seller incentives to disclose quality information to uninformed buyers and often 
assumes that a third-party certifier can verify seller information. In this strand of literature, the 
main tension is between consumers who want more quality information to guide their choice of 
product and low-quality sellers who would like to hide in a pool of high-quality sellers. In 
addition to redistributing the gains from trade between sellers and buyers, quality disclosure may 
also result in efficiency gains if better information leads to a better sorting between consumers 
and products, encourages sellers to improve quality, or forces low-quality sellers to exit the 
market.  In contrast, the second strand of literature puts certifiers under scrutiny. It emphasizes 
that the interest of certifiers may not be aligned with that of buyers, and that certifiers can 
manipulate the information flow to the public. This introduces a number of complications, 
because seller behavior is likely to change in response to certifier behavior and competition 
among certifiers could generate additional incentives for both sellers and certifiers.        
    Below we review the two strands of theory separately. In Sections II.1, we summarize the 
existing theories on seller incentive to voluntarily disclose quality information and then  address 
the merits of mandatory disclosure. In Section II.2, we review theories regarding the role of 
third-party certifiers. 
 
II.1 Seller disclosure 
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     The best known theory of quality disclosure is the so-called “unraveling result.”
15 The 
term “unraveling” refers to the process whereby the best quality firm is first to disclose as a way 
to distinguish itself from lower quality firms.  Once the best firm discloses, the second best firm 
has the same incentive to disclose, and so forth until all but the worst firm discloses.   According 
to Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), if a seller possesses better information about product 
quality than consumers do and there is zero cost to verifiably disclose it, sellers will always 
disclose.  This occurs because rational consumers will infer non-disclosure as having the lowest 
quality.  It follows that sellers will voluntarily disclose quality unless consumers already have 
that information, implying that costly government-mandated disclosure is inefficient and non-
necessary. 
    In reality, there are many markets in which voluntary disclosure is incomplete.  This is 
not surprising, because the basic unraveling result requires several often strong assumptions:   
· Products are vertically differentiated along a single, well-defined dimension of quality 
· Sellers have complete and private information about their own product quality 
· Disclosure is costless  
· Monopoly or competitive market with no strategic interaction among competing sellers 
· Consumers are willing to pay a positive amount for any enhancement of quality 
· Consumers are homogeneous  
· Consumers hold a rational expectation on the quality of non-disclosed products 
· The distribution of available quality is public information  
While any violation of these assumptions could lead to a failure of unraveling, theoretical 
research has focused on the problems posed by disclosure costs, market structure, and the role of 
consumers. 
                                                 
15The term “unraveling” is first used in Viscusi (1978) who provides an example in the context of labor markets.  
13 
     Grossman and Hart (1980) and Jovanovic (1982) show that when disclosure is costly, 
only sellers with product quality above a specific threshold will disclose. Casual observation 
suggests that hospitals that are highly ranked by healthgrades.com and other rating services often 
advertise their rankings, while “average” hospitals remain silent.
16  Though Jovanovic focuses 
on a market with a large number of sellers, it is easy to extend the logic to monopoly as 
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) because disclosure incentives are driven by skeptical 
consumers instead of competition among sellers.  Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Shavell 
(1994) show that if it is costly to acquire quality information, mandatory disclosure may 
motivate sellers to reduce information collection.  For example, a drug company might limit 
studies of side effects if required to disclose all findings from such studies.   
in 
                                                
    Several theories link disclosure incentives to market structure. Board (2008) shows that 
under certain conditions duopolists may fail to disclose quality even if disclosure cost is zero.  
The main intuition is that disclosure may intensify price competition and this can outweigh any 
consumer perceptions of inferior quality. Guo and Zhao (2008) demonstrate that the amount of 
information disclosed depends on whether the duopolists disclose simultaneously or sequentially. 
As compared to simultaneous disclosure, the leader discloses unambiguously less information 
while the follower may reveal less or more information depending on disclosure cost.  
    Unraveling requires consumers to play their part.  Even if a third party verification 
agency rates quality, sellers may hide their ratings if consumers are unaware of them (Faure-
Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesdada, 2007).   For example, restaurants have not usually disclosed 
their health and sanitation reports until compelled by regulation.
17  By the same token, 
unraveling may not occur if consumers do not pay attention to the available information, if 
 
16 Most consumers are unaware of hospital report cards although newspaper accounts of report card scores do seem 
to improve awareness.  See Dranove and Sfekas (2009) for further discussion. 
17 See Napa News February 13, 2005 “Local restaurants skirt the law when it comes to telling diners about 
cleanliness and health.” 
14 
 attentive consumers don't understand the disclosed content, or if consumers make naïve 
inferences about non-disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2004; 
Schwartz, 2005; Stivers, 2004).  Under any of these conditions, lower quality sellers may not 
disclose because at least some consumers do not perceive non-disclosure as a signal of the lowest 
quality.  This may further explain the lack of disclosure of hospital quality report card scores – 
patients may stubbornly believe that their health providers are above average even without 
disclosure.
18  Unraveling may also fail if consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality.  
Board (2008) shows that when duopolists fail to disclose quality, competition for heterogeneous 
consumers softens.  Hotz and Xiao (2009) highlight the importance of consumer heterogeneity 
when products differ in one vertical attribute (quality) and one horizontal attribute (location).  
Under some configurations, providing consumers with more information may result in more 
elastic demand and more intensive price competition, which discourages both low and high 
quality firms from voluntarily disclosing their product quality. 
    Unraveling also assumes that consumers have perfect knowledge about the distribution of 
available quality. In some cases, disclosure can adversely shift the distribution of quality, thereby 
depressing consumer demand for the whole industry (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). This explains 
why all cigarette manufacturers are reluctant to disclose the long-term harm of cigarettes, even if 
some cigarettes are less harmful than others.  
    Other reasons for the failure of full disclosure include (1) the standard of certification is 
unclear or endogenous (Harbaugh, Maxwell and Roussillon, 2007), (2) a seller with high 
measured quality at a given point in time may fear the obligation to disclose in the future when 
measured quality might be lower (for example due to mean regression) (Grubb, 2007)), and (3) 
high quality (and often non-profit) sellers may face capacity constraints and/or price regulations 
                                                 
18 Dranove (2008) calls this the “Lake Woebegone effect,” named for humorist Garrison Kiellor’s fictional town of  
Lake Woebegone, where “all of the children are above average.” 
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 and therefore do not benefit from quality disclosure (Lizzeri and Gavazza, 2007).  Some teaching 
hospitals have been reluctant to embrace report cards for the last reason. 
  Is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure? Market structure, unsophisticated consumers 
and heterogeneous preferences may all precipitate against voluntary disclosure.  Many of the 
papers cited above argue that under these conditions mandatory disclosure laws can promote 
competition and raise consumer surplus, often at the expense of firm profits.  Indeed, the failure 
of disclosure, often revealed in public disasters, has fostered a number of government mandates.   
But mandatory disclosure does not always raise social welfare.  When non-disclosure is due 
solely to disclosure costs, Jovanovic (1982) shows that mandatory disclosure is socially 
excessive.  Mandatory disclosure can also have unintended consequences, such as the 
aforementioned impact on seller effort in detecting quality (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985).  
Mandatory disclosure may encourage “gaming” behavior that boost reported quality but actually 
reduce consumer welfare, as may be the case for hospital report cards that encourage providers to 
avoid the sickest patients (Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, and Satterthwaite, 2003) or result in 
rationing of high quality outputs because high quality suppliers (for example schools and 
hospitals) face a binding capacity constraint (Lizzeri and Gavazza, 2007).  If there are multiple 
dimensions of product quality, mandatory disclosure on one dimension may encourage firms to 
invest in the disclosed dimension but cut back in other dimensions, leading to potential reduction 
in consumer welfare (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat 2008). 
 
II.2 Third-party disclosure and the economics of certifiers 
    Third party disclosure can eliminate the need for government mandated disclosure if the 
certifier can provide precise and unbiased information about product quality. However, that 
condition is hard to meet, sometimes due to the noise in the data generating process and 
16 
 sometimes due to conflict of interest.  The theoretical literature has pinpointed how these 
problems inhibit third party disclosure, with a particular emphasis given to market and 
nonmarket mechanisms that might limit certifier conflict of interest. 
    Quality ratings based on consumer feedback provide a prominent example of noisy data.   
Even if we limit attention to products that consumers can easily evaluate after consumption 
(think of  Zagat’s rating of restaurant services and eBay’s rating of seller service), consumer 
ratings may be noisy or biased because: (1) different consumers may use different criteria to 
measure quality and these criteria are often implicit and unstable; (2) those consumers who 
report quality may not represent all consumers (casual empiricism suggests that the most 
disgruntled consumers are overrepresented), (3) consumers may be reluctant to leave negative 
feedback in fear of retaliation in the future, and (4) consumer feedback is unverifiable, as 
consumers may offer feedback without ever having consumed the product and sellers may leave 
favorable reviews of their own products (while disparaging competitors).
19  
Researchers have offered solutions to problems inherent in consumer evaluations.  
Glazer, McGuire, Cao, and Zaslasky (2008) observe that reporting a simple average of consumer 
scores invites sellers to improve performance for the majority of consumers while ignoring 
product features that are costly to improve but only affect a small number of consumers.  For 
example, health plan report cards may encourage insurers to improve prevention services but 
spend little on improving cancer care.  They propose assigning utility weights on different 
consumer respondents in order to correct this problem.  Alternatively, Miller, Resnick and 
Zeckhauser (2005) propose rewarding individuals whose ratings predict peer ratings.   
                                                 
19 Only half of eBay buyers leave feedback and very few (<1%) are negative (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002).  
Researchers have attributed the lack of negative feedback to consumer desires to be “nice” and fear of seller 
retaliation (see a detailed review in Dellarocus 2003). 
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 Recent events have put a spotlight on the potential conflict of interest in certifiers. The 
Enron scandal raised questions about the veracity of firms that both audit financial statements 
and sell consulting services, ultimately leading to the downfall of Arthur Anderson.
20  In the 
wake of Enron, SEC disallowed accounting companies to perform audit and consulting services 
for the same client.
 21  The 2008 financial meltdown turned attention to bond ratings.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission requires that all public bonds receive a rating from a 
certified agency.  The four agencies that are currently certified to rate bonds – Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s, Fitch Ratings, and Dominion Bond Rating Service – have access to detailed 
financial information about bond issuers and can provide valuable information to bond 
purchasers.  However, a conflict of interest may arise because bond issuers select their rating 
agency and pay a fee for the rating service.  This may motivate bond rating agencies to give 
excessively generous ratings in order to secure future rating business.  Defenders of bond rating 
agencies have suggested that an agency’s reluctance to downgrade may instead reflect a 







                                                
   
Can competition, reputation, or external monitoring mitigate the incentive problem of 
certifiers?  The role of competition is ambiguous. On the positive side, theorists show that th
information content of quality ratings can be enhanced if a monopoly certifier commits to a 
rating criterion before sellers choose their quality investment (Albano and Lizzeri 2001), if the
is competition among certifiers along both price and rating criteria (Lizzeri, 1999; Hvide and
Heifetz, 2001; Miao, 2006), or if consumers already possess some noisy information abou
 
20 For further discussion see Flegm (2005). 
21 See the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm. 
22 Beaver et al. (2006) argue that smoothing may reflect the wishes of large institutional investors, many of which 
have rules that require them to sell bonds that fall below investment grade.  Because such sales can be costly and 
some downgraded bonds may revert to the mean, investors may prefer that bond ratings are smoothed. In addition to 
the four bond rating agencies, brokerage firms may issue their own debt reports.   
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 product quality (Guerra, 2001).  Except for perfect competition, the presence of multiple 
certifiers does not result in full information because noisy grading allows certifiers to extract 
more profits from low-quality sellers.
23  On the negative side, competition may even worsen the 
problem because the presence of multiple certifiers encourages sellers to shop around, espe
when the application for certificate is non-transparent (Farhi, Lerner and Tirole 2008).  In 
combination, certificate shopping and selective disclosure could create a systematic bias in the 
disclosed ratings even if
cially 
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ldkamp, 2009).  
Like competition, reputation concerns do not always help correct the incentives of 
certifiers. Even if consumers can evaluate disclosed information, it may take a long time to
distinguish honest error from strategic manipulation, which leads to an equilibrium where 
certifiers may first provide accurate information and then take advantage of this reputation in 
later periods (Benabou and Laroque, 1992). Motivated by the recent financial crisis, Mathis,
McAndrews and Rochet (2009) show that reputation is sufficient to discipline credit rating 
agencies only when a large fraction of the agencies’ income come from rating simple a
effectiveness of reputation becomes more doubtful in a market with naïve consumers. 
Accounting for certifiers' incentives to understate credit risk and security issuers' incentives to 
shop around, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) show that certifiers are more likely to infla
ratings when a larger fraction of consumers ta
ion costs of rating inflation is lower.  
In some cases, reputation concerns may even drive certifiers to report biased informa
For example, smog check inspectors may pass a failing car if a reputation for giving “easy” 
 
23 Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that a monopoly certifier may choose to reveal full information if it can employ a 
non-linear pricing scheme depending on the certified quality. When the certifier is constrained to charge a flat fee 
for all certificates, it can implement a noisy grading criterion to achieve the same profit. In either case, the seller will 
under invest in quality as compared to the social optimal setting where all information is available free of charge. 
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 passes increases future business (Hubbard, 1998).  To address this problem, many local motor 
vehicle departments test smog check inspectors anonymously, serving the role of “certifier of 
certifiers”. Of course, this raises the problem of who certifies the certifier of certifiers. Another 
form of external monitoring is disclosing conflicts of interest of certifiers. Cain, Loewenstein
Moore (2005) argue that the disclosure can have perverse effects because consumers do no
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external monitoring, do not necessarily correct the incentives of certifiers.  
  
.  
Besides competition, reputation and external monitoring, the fourth potential solution
the incentive problem of certifiers is isolating them from sellers. Intuitively, if certifiers can 
evaluate the product without seller consent and sell the ratings directly to final consumers, they
should not have incentives to please sellers. However, this does not mean the certifier has fu
incentive to reveal unbiased information. For example, a financial analyst may bias a stock 
analysis due to career or reputation concerns (Scharfstein and Stein 1990, Ottaviani and Sorensen 
2006). Even in the absence of conflict of interest, Durbin (2001) argues that certifiers may find it
difficult to extract profits from information provided directly to consumers because uninformed 
consumers may infer quality from market prices and quantities (e.g., 
viewed restaurant), limiting demand for the guidebooks.        
The theoretical literature casts some doubt on the ability of third party certifiers to 
accurately measure quality and, on occasion, their incentives to truthfully disclose it. The former 
problem can be alleviated if the certifier knows the sources of noise in quality data. The latte
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 severity, thereby generating unreliable rankings and encouraging harmful 
se 
e Practice of Quality Disclosure 
The theoretical literature demonstrates that voluntary disclosure, government mandates, 
and third party certifiers do not necessarily improve social welfare.  For certification to enhance 
welfare, it is important to design quality-rating systems carefully, evaluate their effectiveness ex 
post, and improve system design based on theory and evidence. In this section, we will review a 
number of lessons that empirical researchers have learned from the practice of quality disclosure 
tors.  For reference, t
Table 3 about here 
  We motivate the discussion in this section by considering hospital provider report ca
Patients often have little idea of a hospital staff’s competence in diagnosis and surgery and 
would be hard pressed to obtain systematic data about quality.  A hospital might disclose that a
certain percentage of its staff is board certified.  This is a relatively noisy indicator of quality, 
however.  In contrast, a disclosing agency could easily gather data on patient outcomes su
mortality.  Thus, hospital report cards seem like a natural arena for testing theories about 
disclosure.  Yet most evaluations of hospital report cards bear only slightly on the theoretica
issues described above; unraveling and the incentives of certifiers are not addressed at all.  
Instead, the empirical literature focuses on simple questions such as whether patients even pa
attention to report cards.  Other analyses focus on the statistical properties of hospital rep
cards, questioning whether they confound the quality of the hospital with unobservable 
differences in patient
selection behavior.   
  Bearing in mind the frequent disconnect between the issues that attract theorists and tho
that emerge in practice, we begin our review of the empirical literature in Section III.1 with a 
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 discussion of quality measurement.  Section III.2 examines the evidence on unraveling and, if 
voluntary disclosure is incomplete, the kinds of firms that are more likely to disclose.  Section 
III.3 explores whether and how consumers respond to report cards and section III.4 considers 
providers’ responses, including whether providers improve quality or try to game the system.  
We conclude in section III.5 by reviewing empirical papers that have examined certifier behavior 
 the financial industries. 





depending on how their average scores have changed from one year to the next.   
in
 
III.1 Defining and Reporting Quality 
  Perhaps the most common approach to reporting quality is to compute average scores for 
one or more quality dimensions.  For example, certifiers often report average mortality rates
hospital or mean test scores for a school.  A major problem with the “average” approach is 
precision; there often is not enough data to generate small confidence intervals around the 
reported scores.  Consider evaluating hospital mortality.   Medicare Hospital Compare recently
identified hospitals whose mortality rates were statistical outliers.  Because mortality is a rare 
event, confidence intervals were large and only 3 percent of the nation’s hospitals were identified 
as having either high or low quality.  Or consider school performance.  There are typically fewer 
than 100 students in a given grade in a given U.S. public school.  Kane and Staiger (2002) argue 
that as a result of this small numbers problem, the 95 percentage confidence interval of a school's 
mean score is as wide as the gap between the 25 and 75 percentiles of the score distribution.
only does this imply that much of the score difference between two schools is likely due to 
sampling error, it also implies that the best and worst ranked schools are more likely to be sma
schools.  Some certifiers report improvements in quality.   These reports are compromised by 
mean reversion.   Kane and Staiger (2002) argue that it is misleading to reward or 
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   Large sample size can minimize sampling error but does nothing for mean reversion.  
Nor can a large sample size filter out confounding factors if many individuals in the sample share 
a common unobservable attribute and this attribute is correlated with the final score. For 
example, a simple average of patient mortality can underestimate the quality of a large teaching 
hospital because such a hospital tends to admit sicker patients. By the same logic, a school 
located in a high-income area may achieve better test scores because children from high-income 
families tend to have highly educated parents.  
  Although these problems seem to be well-known among certifiers, they are often ignored.  
For example, some health insurers emphasize vaccination rates in pediatrician report cards, even 
though these rates are known to vary with patient income and education.  Many other certifiers 
do adjust raw quality scores using data on demographics and other relevant exogenous 
characteristics.   Medicare computes risk-adjusted mortality rates for heart attack patients in two 
steps.
24   First, a hierarchical regression model is used to regress 30-day mortality of heart attack 
patients on age, gender and comorbidities. This regression yields the predicted mortality rate for 
a specific hospital given its own patient case mix, as well as an expected mortality rate that the 
same patients with the same characteristics would have should they be treated at an “average” 
hospital. Second, a hospital's risk-adjusted mortality rate is defined as [(actual mortality / 
expected mortality) * (U.S national unadjusted mortality rate of heart attack patients)]. To the 
extent that the regression model has controlled for all the health conditions that affect a patient's 
mortality risk, it permits a direct comparison of hospitals that treat patients with different 
severities.
25   
                                                 
24http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/Hospital/Static/InformationforProfessionals_tabset.asp?activeTab=2&Langu
age=English&version=default&subTab=3. 
25The algorithm claims to have a special control for small hospitals or small number of cases. See the website cited 
in the last footnote for more details.    
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   Risk adjustment is no panacea.  In a field as complex as medicine, the range of potential 
risk adjusters is vast, the availability of specific adjusters varies, and implications of choosing 
specific adjusters can be profound.  Iezzoni (1997) obtains markedly different rankings by 
applying different risk adjusters to the same outcomes data.  This suggests the need for uniform 
and complete risk adjusters.  Unfortunately, the predictive power of mortality regressions 
remains low, suggesting that important risk adjusters are unavailable to certifiers.  As more risk 
adjusters become available, Iezzoni’s results suggest that rankings may change.    
    All of the problems mentioned above are magnified if quality is multi-dimensional or if 
outcomes are not readily tied to suppliers.  Consider reporting the quality of urologists for the 
treatment of prostate cancer.  Outcomes of interest include mortality, pain, incontinence and 
impotence.  While theoretically possible to compute four quality measures, patients might find it 
difficult to compare them. Moreover, some outcomes such as incontinence may continue months 
or years after treatment, necessitating complex data collection.  Similar issues arise in measuring 
quality in education, where the performance of a grade school teacher may not be apparent until 
the students are in high school or beyond.   
 
III.2 Does unraveling generate full disclosure in practice?  
Sellers often do not disclose their quality.  Left to their own devices, hospitals did not 
report risk adjusted mortality, perhaps because it would be difficult for patients to verify and 
interpret the data.  It is perhaps more difficult to explain why public schools have not voluntarily 
reported standardized test scores.  Using salad dressing as an example, Mathios (2000) 
demonstrates that many producers of higher-fat salad dressing withheld fat information before 
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act came into effect.  Moreover, there remained large 
variation in fat content among the non-disclosing dressings and those with the highest fat levels 
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 experienced a significant decline in sales after they were required to disclose.  This experience 
suggests that unraveling may fail to occur even in markets with credible, low-cost mechanisms 
to disclose.  
Theory predicts that firms are more likely to disclose if disclosure cost is lower, product 
quality is higher, or the expected benefits from disclosure are greater conditional on quality and 
disclosure cost.  There is substantial evidence supporting these predictions: on the cost side, 
Bushee and Leuz (2005) find that regulation of disclosure information for firms that were traded 
on the over-the-counter bulletin board has increased disclosure costs and forced smaller firms out 
of the market. Using whether a seller uses professional software to post photos on eBay as a 
proxy for disclosure cost, Lewis (2009) finds that “low cost” sellers (those with access to 
professional software) post far more photos than average and that sellers post more photos after 
switching to professional software. On the benefit side, Francis, Khurana, and Pareira (2005) 
present evidence that firms in industries with greater external financing needs choose to disclose 
more financial information to the market, and an expanded disclosure policy for these firms leads 
to a lower cost of both debt and equity capital. Conversely, Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2008) 
presents evidence that firms are more likely to go “dark” in the financial market because of poor 
future prospects, distress, and increased compliance costs after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
However, contrary to the common wisdom, even when the disclosed information is 
certified by a third-party, disclosing firms do not necessarily have higher quality than the non-
disclosing firms.  This may be because the non-disclosing firms already have a good reputation 
and therefore do not need certification.  Edelman (2006) presents evidence that TRUSTe-
certified websites are more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy as uncertified sites. He 
argues that this occurs because the online “trust” authority issues certifications without 
substantial verification of the actual trustworthiness of recipients.  
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 In another example, Jin (2005) explores why only half of all health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) voluntarily disclose quality via the National Committee on Quality 
Assurance (NCQA).  Disclosure cost is definitely not the main story, as some reporting HMOs 
explicitly instruct NCQA to withhold the information from plan-identifiable publication.  After 
controlling for cost and demand factors, Jin finds that the disclosure decision is likely driven by 
incentives to differentiate from competitors. She shows that early disclosers are more likely to 
operate in highly competitive markets but the average disclosure rate tends to be lower in such 
markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation.  The counter-intuitive 
relationship between competition and disclosure is not necessarily surprising; theorists have 
argued that zero-cost disclosure should unravel in a monopoly market (Grossman, 1981; 
Milgrom, 1981) but may not unravel in a differentiated duopoly (Board, 2008).  Jin and Sorensen 
(2006) further show that the distribution of quality among reporting HMOS that authorize 
NCQA to disclose quality overlaps the distribution of quality among HMOs that do not authorize 
public disclosure, although the former do report better quality on average.   
 
III.3   Does disclosure improve consumer choice? 
  One of the purported benefits of disclosure is that it facilitates better matches between 
consumers and products.  Consumers may migrate towards higher quality sellers (“vertical 
sorting”) or to sellers whose product characteristics best meet their idiosyncratic needs 
(“horizontal sorting.”)   Both vertical and horizontal sorting effect could substantially increase 
welfare even if product attributes remain unchanged.   
All available evidence pertains to vertical sorting.   For example, Ippolito and Mathios 
(1990) show that consumers switched to breakfast cereals with higher fiber content after 
producers were allowed to make health claims about fiber.  Hastings and Weinstein (2008) find 
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 that parents who responded to government-mandated information about public school quality by 
switching their children’s enrollment chose schools scoring 0.5 student-level standard deviations 
above the schools their children left behind.   
Several studies of vertical sorting examine health insurance and health provider report 
cards.  Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) examine health plan choices when plan report cards were 
introduced to federal employees in the mid 1990s.  Scanlon et al. (2002) study how General 
Motor employees responded to the dissemination of health plan ratings in 1997, Beaulieu (2002) 
studies plan choices among Harvard employees, Jin and Sorensen (2006) examine how federal 
annuitants respond to publicized health plan ratings, and Dafny and Dranove (2008) focus on 
Medicare enrollees choices of Medicare managed care plans subsequent to the publication of 
Medicare & You quality rankings.  In all these situations, higher ranked plans enjoy increases in 
market share.  Most of these studies also consider plan choices prior to report cards, finding that 
consumers seem to have some knowledge of quality differences that report cards augment.    
Quality disclosure may fail to affect demand if ratings are difficult to understand or 
provide irrelevant information.  Disclosure may also fail to affect demand if ratings confirm what 
consumers already know about quality (Marshall et al. 2000).  Following the 1990 introduction 
of New York's cardiovascular surgery report cards, Dranove and Sfekas (2008) show that higher 
ranked hospitals did not appear to gain significant market shares. This finding concurs with the 
previous literature (Schneider and Epstein, 1998; Romano and Zhou, 2004). However, Dranove 
and Sfekas also find that hospitals whose rankings differed from prior beliefs experienced a 
significant change in market share.      
The endogeneity of voluntary disclosure poses a problem to researchers who may be 
unable to observe firm characteristics that are observed by consumers.  Using instrumental 
variables to address the endogeneity of child care centers decisions to seek voluntarily 
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 accreditation by the National Association for the Education of Young Children, Xiao (2007) 
finds that an accredited center tends to have lower unobservable (to the researcher) quality.  
Researchers who disregard endogeneity will underestimate consumer responses to accreditation. 
After correcting for the endogeneity bias, Xiao finds that consumers rely on both reputation and 
accreditation status for information and they respond less to accreditation for old firms.    
Many of the aforementioned studies find heterogeneous consumer responses to quality 
information. For example, health plan ratings are more likely to affect individuals choosing a 
plan for the first time (Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002, Jin and Sorensen 2006), plan ratings are more 
effective in the areas where consumers had less information prior to the publication of quality 
measures (Dafny and Dranove, 2008), and quality reporting for fertility clinics has a greater 
effect in the states that mandate insurance coverage for the reported fertility treatment (Bundorf, 
Chun, Goda, and Kessler, 2008). 
Consumer response to disclosure may differ by attention as well. In a study of earnings 
disclosures, Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) show that late day Friday announcements (a time 
where consumers arguably pay less attention to financial news) have a 15% lower immediate 
stock price response and a 70% higher delayed response as compared to announcements made in 
other weekdays.  
Consumer response is sensitive to the reported measures of quality. Scanlon, Chernew, 
Sheffler, and Fenwick (2002) find that GM employees respond to overall quality indices but not 
to specific quality measures. Similarly, Dafny and Dranove (2008) find that the effect of health 
plan report cards on Medicare beneficiaries is driven by responses to consumer satisfaction 
scores, while other more objective quality measures rate did not affect enrollment decisions. 
Pope (2006) studies the effects of hospital rankings in US News and World Reports.  He finds 
that changes in discrete rankings affected patient choice, even after controlling for continuous 
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 quality.  This array of findings suggest that consumers may have limited cognitive ability and 
therefore tend to focus on a subset of measures that are easier to understand. As a counter 
example, Bundorf, Chun, Goda, and Kessler (2008) find evidence of consumer sophistication 
when they evaluate the quality of fertility clinics. Clinics with a disproportionate share of young, 
relatively easy-to-treat patients were more likely to have high birth rates due to patient mix, yet 
such clinics are found to have lower market shares after the adoption of report cards, suggesting 
that consumers could see through the simple statistics.  
A significant literature in finance and accounting assesses the financial impact of 
disclosure by measuring market price responses to a financial disclosure (by a firm itself or via a 
third-party certifier). For example, studies find that share values respond to changes in bond 
ratings, with some studies showing that the market responds more to bad news than to good 
news.
26  Such asymmetric response may explain why some credit rating agencies are reluctant to 
downgrade (Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman, 2006) and why firms tend to announce bad news 
on late Friday (Della Vigna and Pollet 2009). In a similar spirit, Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2006) find strong market response when the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments 
extended the mandatory disclosure requirements for listed firms to large firms traded over the 
counter.  
It is difficult to apply the event-study approach to quality disclosure of non-financial 
products because no centralized market exists to aggregate the disclosed information into a 
universal market price. Alternatively, Jin and Sorenson (2006) use demand estimates to monetize 
the value of disclosure.  They let ui(j) denote individual i’s indirect utility from product j. Let Ai 
denote the product that individual i would choose if quality information is available, and Bi  the 
product that would be chosen in the absence of the information.  Then the dollar value of the 
                                                 
26 See Kliger and Sarig (2000) for how security market responds to the refinement of Moody’s credit rating system. 
This paper also reviews previous research on market response to changes in credit rating.   
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 information to individual i is [ui(Ai)−ui(Bi)]/αi, where αi is the marginal utility of a dollar. Under 
this definition, information is valueless (ex post) if it doesn’t change the individual’s choice. In 
other words, it does not count the psychological utility gain (loss) that people may derive from 
being told that their chosen product is rated high (low) even if that information would not have 
affected their choice.  
Following this framework, Jin and Sorensen (2006) estimate that the publication of plan 
ratings only motivate 0.7 percent of federal annuitants to change their health plan choices, due to 
the enormous inertia in individual plan choice.  For those individuals whose decisions are 
materially affected by the ratings, the value of the information is estimated to be $160 per person 
per year. Averaged over all individuals in the sample, the value of the published scores is only 
$1.11 per person. Adding a Bayesian learning structure to a similar random utility model, 
Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon (2008) estimate that GM employees were willing to pay 
about $330 per year (about 5 percent of premiums) to avoid one subpar performance rating, and 
the average value of the report card was about $20 per employee per year.  Finally, Dranove and 
Sfekas (2008) find that hospitals whose report card scores are two standard deviations below the 
expected score stood to lose $1.4 million dollars in revenues annually. 
Since the estimated value of information depends on the estimated marginal utility of a 
dollar (which is often obtained from the coefficient of price), this estimation is sensitive to the 
endogeneity of price. If price is correlated with unobserved plan quality, it tends to bias the 
estimates toward finding relatively inelastic demand, which in turn leads to an upward bias in the 
estimated dollar value of information. Again, this identification issue stresses the importance of 
controlling for the information that consumers already know before quality disclosure.  
Estimating consumer response to quality information becomes more complicated if the 
industry is subject to price regulation or capacity constraints.  School ratings provide an excellent 
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 example. In light of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, many states require elementary and 
secondary schools to collect, submit, and publicize a report card describing school quality in a 
specific grade. Even if we put aside the measurement problems in school ratings, publicizing 
ratings could lead to very different consumer responses as compared to other markets for three 
reasons: first, most students obtain public education free of tuition; second, whether a public 
school is in a student's choice set often depends on student residence; and third, even within a 
student's choice set, most local schools are subject to capacity constraint and therefore students 
may not be able to attend their first-choice school. All three factors suggest that one cannot use 
the above utility framework to monetize the value of school ratings.  Instead, researchers might 
prefer to examine other factors such as improvements in test scores (see references in Section 
III.4) or even real estate values (Figlio and Lucas, 2004).    
To summarize, empirical studies have found evidence that consumers respond to quality 
disclosure when rankings differ from preconceptions. The nature of the response depends on 
whether the disclosed information is easy to access and understand, and whether consumers pay 
attention to disclosure.  
 
III.4  Does disclosure improve quality?   
    If disclosure affects demand, the returns to quality should increase, as high quality firms 
increase sales, boost prices, or both.
27  This, in turn, should prompt sellers to raise quality.  
Several studies document this salutary provider response.  Using detailed data before and after 
Los Angeles County adopted restaurant hygiene grade cards in 1998, Jin and Leslie (2003) find 
that after Los Angeles County posted restaurant hygiene grade cards in 1998, hospitalizations 
from food-borne diseases declined by 20 percent, largely because restaurants and consumers 
                                                 
27Wimmer and Chezum (2003) and Dewan and Hsu (2004) have shown that certified goods have higher market 
price than non-certified goods. 
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 preparing meals at home improved hygiene as opposed to consumers choosing more hygienic 
restaurants.  Similarly, Bennear and Olmstead (2007) examine how Massachusetts drinking 
water suppliers responded to 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, which 
mandated disclosure of contaminant levels.  They find that larger utilities required to mail 
consumer confidence reports directly to customers reduced total violations by 30-44 percent and 
reduced more severe health violations by 40-57 percent.  
Seller responses to disclosure can be heterogeneous. Focusing on the effect of India's 
Green Rating Project on the largest pulp and paper plants in India, Powers, Blackman, Lyon and 
Narain (2008) find that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty 
plants but not among cleaner ones. Moreover, plants located in wealthier communities were more 
responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.  Chen (2008) studies the effect of the 
Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI), finding that lower quality nursing homes improved 
relative to high quality homes, with the most striking changes occurring in more competitive 
markets. 
While disclosure appears to provide firms with incentives to improve quality, Bar-Isaac 
et al. (2008) point out that this may harm consumers if quality is multidimensional and only 
some dimensions are disclosed, as firms may boost reported quality but shirk on unreported 
quality.  Lu (2009) notes that the NHQI collects data on a wide variety of quality dimensions but 
only reports a subset of this data.  She finds evidence that after the introduction of the NHQI: (1) 
the proportion of effort allocated to unreported dimensions decreases; (2) quality improves 
insignificantly along the reported dimensions but deteriorates along the unreported ones; (3) 
there is no evidence that nursing homes increase quality-related inputs. These findings suggest 
that firms may respond to information disclosure by reallocating effort across dimensions of 
quality, with potentially no net benefit for consumers.   
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 Because quality measures are often imperfect, it is possible to increase the reported 
quality measures without any improvement in actual quality.  In particular, when reported quality 
depends on the characteristics of the consumer as well as the performance of the seller, sellers 
can improve performance by strategically selling to the “right” consumers.  Hospital report cards 
provide an excellent example. In 1990-1992, New York and Pennsylvania adopted hospital and 
surgeon report card based on cardiovascular mortality rates. Although these mortality rates are 
risk adjusted, the adjustment is imperfect. Consequently, hospitals subject to mandatory report 
cards may have greater incentives to refuse to treat severely ill patients. The patients who 
inappropriately receive nonsurgical treatments may suffer greater long term health problems and 
potentially die due to treatment delays. Using national data on Medicare patients at risk for 
cardiac surgery, Dranove, Kessler, McClellan and Satterthwaite (2003) find that cardiac surgery 
report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led both to selection behavior by providers leading 
to higher levels of resource use and to worse health outcomes, particularly for sicker patients. 
They conclude that, at least in the short run, these report cards decreased patient and social 
welfare.  As further evidence of selection, Werner and Asch (2005) find that the incidence of 
cardiac surgery for minority patients relative to white patients declined in New York subsequent 
to the introduction of report cards.   
 Similar concerns have been expressed about school report cards. Highlighted by the 
2001 No Child Left Behind Act, both federal and state accountability laws require schools to 
report statistics of student performance as a measure of school quality. Most available studies 
find that accountability has had a positive effect on student outcomes (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; 
Hanushek and Raymond, 2004; Jacob, 2005; Peterson and West, 2003). But the effect is not 
always attributable to disclosing school report cards to the public. Using student performance 
data across 42 states in 1993-2002, Hanushek and Raymond (2005) find that accountability laws 
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 have a significant, positive effect on math and reading test scores, but the publication of school 
reports cards has zero impact. This suggests that quality improvement is more attributable to 
consequential accountability rather than disclosure per se.  
  Critics of school report cards express concerns about gaming.  Schools may increase 
grade retention or place poor-performing students into special education so that they are not 
counted in school ratings. These gaming activities have been documented by Jacob (2005) for 
Chicago public schools, by Haney (2000), Deere and Strayer (2001) and Cullen and Reback 
(2006) in Texas, and by Figlio and Getzler (2006) in Florida.  However, Hanushek and Raymond 
(2005) argue that state-specific evidence of gaming, often obtained by comparing special 
education placement rate immediately before and after the introduction of accountability, may be 
driven by national trends instead of strategic gaming of school ratings.  
Changing the pool of subjects is not the only way to game a performance-based 
disclosure system. Other types of gaming include teaching to the test, extending test time, or 
blatant cheating. Using data from the Chicago Public Schools, Jacob and Levitt (2003) develop 
an algorithm to detect teacher cheating based on unexpected test score fluctuations and 
suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. They find that severe teacher or 
administrator cheating on standardized tests occurs in at least 4 to 5 percent of elementary school 
classrooms annually. The observed cheating frequency increased after a 1996 accountability 
regulation holds schools accountable for low achievement in test scores.  
  In summary, empirical studies confirmed the theoretical arguments that quality disclosure 
has strength and pitfalls.  On the positive side, there is fairly strong evidence from healthcare and 
finance that disclosure enables consumers to identify superior sellers.  Evidence from education 
in this regard is less compelling.  There is also some evidence from a variety of markets 
including healthcare that disclosure motivates sellers to improve quality. However, there is also 
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 considerable evidence from healthcare and education that sellers have attempted to game the 
system at the expense of consumers, especially if the measured quality does not cover all 
dimensions of quality or does not adjust for characteristics of consumers that can affect the 
rankings.  There is no consensus as to whether the benefits outweigh the costs. 
 
III.5 Evidence on certifier behavior 
Most evidence of certifier behavior focuses on (1) the content of the certified information 
and (2) competition among certifiers.  
A certifier can manipulate both the bias and precision of reported information. It is easy 
to see how a certifier can bias information.  Certifiers can also alter precision by intentionally 
adding noise to the signals they observe. The latter phenomenon has been highlighted in 
theoretical work predicting that a certifier may have incentive to adopt crude rating intervals (e.g. 
pass or fail) even if it observes the true product quality with zero cost (Lizzeri, 1999). 
The most comprehensive studies of certifier bias and precision focus on financial analysts 
because their forecast of corporate earnings can be easily tested in the market. A large literature 
has documented that earnings forecasts are systematically overoptimistic and the extent of bias is 
predictable from publicly available information. Some attribute the bias to conflict of interest.  
For example, Michaely and Womack (1999) show that the “buy” recommendations made by 
analysts affiliated with the underwriting brokerage perform significantly worse than similar 
recommendations made by unaffiliated analysts. Their evidence suggests that underwriter 
analysts have a significant positive bias due to conflict of interest and, interestingly, the market 
does not recognize this bias to the full extent. Using the well-known hierarchy of brokerage firms 
as a proxy for career outcomes, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that optimistic analysts (relative to 
the consensus after controlling for forecast accuracy) are more likely to move up in career. This 
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 suggests that career concern can be an important reason for the positive forecast bias. Lim (2001) 
presents evidence that rational analysts may choose to forecast with a positive bias so that the 
analyst can access better information from the management in the future and therefore improve 
her overall accuracy.  
Studies of credit ratings suggest that SEC-certified bond ratings agencies are more 
conservative than non-certified agencies (Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman, 2006) and rating 
agencies revise grades only when they are unlikely to reverse their decision shortly afterwards 
(Loffler 2005).   Concerns about such conservative behavior have prompted policy makers to 
encourage competition and transparency in order to raise the quality of rating services (SEC 
2008). However, the theoretical prediction on competition is mixed: on the one hand, 
competition may motivate certifiers to provide refined information; on the other hand, it may 
also invite strategic certificate shopping and result in coarse ratings.  
  Even when reporting on the same set of firms, certifiers may not agree on the ratings. 
This fact has been documented in many markets but has received the most scrutiny in credit 
markets.
28 In bond ratings, different ratings from different agencies are often referred to as “split 
ratings.” Focusing on the comparison between Moody's and Standard & Poor’s ratings, 
researchers have found that the market treats U.S. bonds with split ratings differently from the 
bonds with equal ratings and the bonds with only one of the two ratings (Thompson and Vaz, 
1990; Cantor, Packer and Cole, 1997).  This could be driven by (a) Moody's and Standard & 
Poor’s using different rating criteria, or by (b) the bond issuers that select to be rated by both 
agencies are different from those choosing only one rating and the bonds with split ratings are 
systematically different the bonds with equal ratings.  
                                                 
28 Differential ratings are documented in consumer products (Friedman 1990), health plan report cards (Scanlon, 
Chernew, Sheffler, and Fendrick, 1998) and college rankings (Pike, 2004). 
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   To distinguish the two explanations, Cantor and Packer (1997) examine the factors 
driving the split ratings between Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and two other rating agencies that 
accept voluntary request for bond rating. They find limited evidence of selection bias, which 
implies that different rating agencies may use different rating criteria. Similarly, Doherty, 
Kartasheva and Phillips (2009) take S&P’s entry as a natural experiment and show that S&P 
applies a more stringent rating standard than the incumbent (A.E. Best). As a result, better-than-
average insurers within each A.E. Best’s rating category are more likely to seek a second rating 
from S&P. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) broaden the scope of professional certifiers to 
include both private certifiers and regulators. They use price and rating data to infer whether the 
government rating of a bank holding company causes a movement in Moody's rating of the same 
company, or vice versa. They find Granger-causality in both directions, suggesting that 
supervisors and bond rating agencies both acquire some information that aids the other group in 
forecasting changes in bank condition.   
  These studies use both price and rating data to infer differences across certifiers but they 
do not reveal the full structure of grading differentiation. To overcome this problem, Jin, Kato 
and List (2008) uses two field experiments to study three professional sports card certifiers. They 
find that the two new entrants adopt more precise signals and use finer grading cutoffs to 
differentiate themselves from the incumbent certifier. The measured grading cutoffs map 
consistently into prevailing market prices, suggesting that the market recognizes differences 
across multiple grading criteria. 
  Consistent with the theory, several studies suggest that competition among certifiers is 
not always helpful.  Becker and Milbourn (2008) show that increased competition from Fitch's 
growth in the corporate bond rating market led to more issuer-friendly ratings and also less 
informative ratings.  Similarly, Tan and Wang (2008) find that credit ratings are less stable when 
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 more rating agencies rate a bond.  Hubbard (2002) finds that auto smog emissions testers may 
issue favorable test results in order to cultivate future business.   
Unlike for-profit certifiers who may have an incentive to understate problems in order to 
attract business, most government certifiers have little direct financial incentive to bias their 
ratings.  But government certifiers face a different set of incentive issues: they may not be 
sufficiently rewarded for their effort, they may rely on subjective quality measures, and their 
personal preference may be in line with or against the interests of their clients (Prendergast 
2007).    Examining more than 1000 inspections by the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, 
Feinstein (1989) finds considerable variation in the probability of detecting violations. 
Interestingly, detection rates increased sharply after the Three Mile Island accident of 1979.  
Similar inspector heterogeneity is also found in FDA inspection of drug manufacturing facilities 
(Macher, Mayo and Nickerson, 2008).   
  To summarize, empirical studies of certifiers have confirmed the theoretical insights: 
both public and private certification can be noisy and not fully revealing; in addition, 
competition among certifiers does not necessarily improve information as it may motivate 
certifiers to relax their rating criterion or encourage sellers to strategically shop for favorable 
ratings.  
 
IV. Future research 
Quality disclosure is an important tool for facilitating consumer purchases when other 
forms of quality assurance are inadequate.  There are many examples in which quality disclosure 
has allowed consumers to find sellers who best meet their needs, including restaurants, education 
and healthcare.  There is less evidence that sellers respond by boosting quality.  Instead, most 
studies of seller responses seem to focus on gaming behavior that often harms consumers.  
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 Research suggests that quality disclosure is a two-edged sword in other ways, with problems 
including measurement error, consumer misunderstanding, and inspector bias.  It is difficult to 
state with confidence that disclosure in such important sectors as healthcare, education, or 
finance has unambiguously helped consumers. 
Much additional research is required to help certifiers design optimal quality disclosure 
schemes.   A well designed quality measure should be precise, inexpensive to generate, easy to 
understand, all while minimizing opportunities for sellers and certifiers to game the system.  For 
example, a hospital quality report card might be more effective than a surgeon report card.  One 
simple reason is that sample size is larger.  Perhaps more importantly, many hospitals have the 
ability to allocate patients across surgeons and will be able to assign the toughest cases to the 
best surgeons.  If surgeon quality was directly reported, then the best surgeons (indeed, all 
surgeons) might instead shun the toughest cases.  Certification of hospitals raises unexplored 
issues concerning regulated industries including health care and education.   If high quality 
sellers are unable to raise prices, how will they ration demand?   
Optimal disclosure design will likely borrow from the literature on multitasking 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).   The effects of disclosing some dimensions of quality but not 
others is similar to the effects of directly rewarding some dimensions but not others (Lu, 2008).  
Thus, it will be important for disclosing organizations to consider substitution and 
complementarities in production, the organization of productive teams, and other factors that 
affect optimal contract design in agency relationships. 
There is also a considerable gap in our understanding of certifier behavior, the 
importance of which was underscored by the 2008 subprime crisis.  Theoretical work points to 
the potential benefits of regulating certifiers and empirical evidence is beginning to emerge on 
certifier bias and competition among credit rating agencies.  Given the perception that 
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 certification failed financial markets on a massive scale and the potential scope for regulation, 
work in this area is needed urgently.   
Finally, while most existing studies have examined the short run consequences of quality 
disclosure, little is known about long run effects   Quality disclosure may drive out low quality 
firms, invite entry by high quality competitors, or encourage incumbents to improve quality.  
Even consumers who ignore disclosure can benefit from these responses, which may prove to be 
an important benefit of report cards.   
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 Table 1:  Quality Assurance Mechanisms Used in Various Markets 
 













Airlines X X    X X 
Appliances X  X  X  X




X X  X  X
Hospitals X  X    X X X
30 X
Lawyers X  X    X
Movies X X    X X
Plumbers   X    X
Restaurants X  X    X X
31  
Universities X  X    X
32 XX
 
                                                 
29Fuel economy standards and other safety standards. 
30Several states and the federal Medicare program publish quality report cards. 
31Notably, health and safety inspections. 
32A number of regional and national accreditation agencies accredit universities, colleges, and vocational programs 
for post-secondary education.  
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